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THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES
WITH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES;
LESSONS FOR POLAND*
Introduction
Greece has applied for membership in the European Communities
on June 13, 1975, Portugal on March 28, 1977, and Spain in the
same year on July 28. With the treaties signed in the meantime
Greece has become the tenth member country since January 1,
1981, while Portugal and Spain have become the eleventh and
twelth member since January 1, 1986. However, the routes of
these countries to the EC were much longer.
The aim of the study is to overview the experience of Greece,
Portugal and Spain with their accessions to the European Commu-
nities (EC) and to formulate various conclusions and recommen-
dations for Poland where the association agreement with the EC
is treated as a specific vehicle to full membership in the Com-
munities. Of particular interest are the economic liberaliza-
tion, macroeconomic policy and economic performance of the
Three till the end of the 1980's. Respective aspects are com-
pared and discussed. With regard to economic performance the
results achieved by the whole EC-12 are additionally treated as
reference points. Then follow the lessons for Poland.
This paper has benefited from financial support from the
EC's Action for Cooperation in the Field of Economics (ACE)
in the framework of a joint research project on "Reintegra-
tion of Poland into the West European Economy by Internal
and External Liberalization" undertaken by the Warsaw Eco-
nomy Research Institute, the Milan SDA Bocconi Institute and
the Kiel Institute of World Economics [Grant No.
901 000 81 P].
The author is indebted to Christiane Krieger-Boden, Hugo
Dicke, Federico Foders and Ralph Heinrich from the Kiel In-
stitute of World Economics for many helpful comments. How-
ever, he himself is responsible for the contents of the
study.I. Mediterranean Countries Before the EC Membership
1. Political and Systemic Environment
After World War II Greece, Portugal and Spain underwent re-
markably rapid transformations from autocratic states (under
Colonels' Junta, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and his successor
Marcello Caetano, and under General Francisco Franco respec-
tively) into parliamentary democracies, from politically and
economically isolated countries into relatively open ones. The
Colonels' Junta collapsed in 1974 (seven years after their
coup), Marcello Caetano in April 1974 and General Franco in
December 1975, when he died.
The transformations which took place in Greece, Portugal and
Spain brought with them political and social stability (e.g.
the famous Moncloa Pact signed in October 1977 between the
main political parties, including the communists), and with
regard to economic aspects to greater openness and increasing
liberalization. After years, even decades of autarky, first,
and state intervention and regulation, later, the new democra-
tic governments elected had to deregulate, in order to open the
economies and to integrate them into the world economy.
A common feature of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish democra-
tization and liberalization episodes have been the compromises
made with international or multinational organizations like the
United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Internati-
onal Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Ge-
neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization
for European Cooperation and Development (OECD) and - last but
not least - with the European Communities (EC). All these or-
ganizations have supported, reinforced or sustained the demo-
cratization, deregulation and liberalization measures adopted
by the successive governments of Greece, Portugal and Spain
giving them more internal and external credibility. This has
been of great importance.2. Level of Economic Development and Structure of National
Economies
During the period 1960-1973, Greece with an annual average rate
of 7.8 %, Portugal with one of 6.9 % and Spain with one of
7.2 % experienced a rate of real economic growth which exceeded
by far the average performance of the EC-9 (4.8%). However, in
the next years growth in these countries slackened markedly.
Therefore, the economic distance of these countries from the EC
as measured by per capita incomes, which had narrowed remar-
kably in the 1960's, increased to some extent.
Table 1
Gross National Product in the EC Countries, Greece,































































































































































Till 1971 the EC without Portugal and Spain.
Source: EC [1989, pp. 249-251] and own calculations.In 1980, the GDP per capita income in the EC-9 reached the le-
vel of 10 510 US-$, against 4 400 US-$ in Greece, 2 410 US-$ in
Portugal and 5 695 US-$ in Spain. So the three countries,
especially Portugal, had a big economic potential to seize
their opportunities as latecomers in a growing world economy
[Schatz, 1981].
During the 1960's and 1970's economic growth of Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain was clearly industry-determined. As a conse-
quence, the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP and
its share in employment increased significantly in these coun-
tries whereas in the EC-9 its importance declined. Also the
growth of the service sector in the Three exceeded signifi-
cantly the growth of this sector in the EC-9. Both in the Three
and in the EC-9 agriculture lost very rapidly its importance.
Table 2
Structure of Production and Employment in Greece, Portugal,

























































Source: Schatz [1981, p. 22],On the eve of Greece's accession to the EC just in this country
the importance of agriculture was the highest among the Three
in terms of output. In 1978, this sector accounted for 17.2 %
of all production and 27.3 % of all employment, while in the
EC-9 the respective averages amounted to 4.1 % and 8.0 %. At
the beginning of the 1980's Spain became the country with the
lowest share of the primary sector in total output and employ-
ment among the Three.
With their fast development Greece, Portugal and Spain expe-
rienced a rapid growth of foreign trade surpassing even the EC
achievement. Since around 1974, however, this record was much
poorer, especially in Portugal. Nevertheless, the share of for-
eign trade in the GDP of these countries increased conside-
rably. Especially increased importance of the EC countries'
markets.
Table 3
Shares of Goods' and Services' Exports in GDP of Greece, Portugal,






























































































Source: EC [1989, pp. 264 and 265].
Similar to the development process, the foreign trade of
Greece, Portugal and - to a lesser degree - of the fartherst
industrialized Spain was determined by the expansion of manu-
factured goods' exports. As it was the case in world trade, the
growth rates of manufactured goods' exports trade were, as a
rule, substantially higher than the growth rates for otherproducts. As a consequence, manufactured goods increased their
share in total exports, mainly at the expense of food. This was
typical for countries pursuing industrialization and therefore
experiencing changes in their relative factor endowment and
their factor prices.
Table 4
Shares of Manufactured Goods in Merchandise Trade of Greece,
Portugal, Spain and the EC-9 in 1970 and 1979 (%)
Country/region Imports Exports
1970 1979 1970 1979
Greece 78.3 72.4 54.8 72.8
Portugal 71.8 67.9 67.3 69.5
Spain 67.0 64.2 72.0 70.1
EC-9 69.8 73.0 80.4 77.8
Source: Schatz [1981, p. 23].
In the 1970's one of the astonishing features of the Greek,
Portuguese and Spanish foreign trade in manufactured goods was
the decreasing importance of these goods in relations with the
EC countries, both on the import and export side (table 5).
Greece was a leading country in this respect.
Manufacturing trade of Greece, Portugal and Spain with the EC-9
had some significant characteristics. As Donges and Schatz
[1979, p. 221] put it, in the 1970's "imports of manufactures
to the Three are commonly dominated by chemicals and machinery,
broadly classified as human-capital-intensive goods; while
other manufactured goods - products which are labour-intensive
- account for the overhelming part of exports. Having readily
available domestic labour forces, these countries mainly export
labour-intensive goods and import human-capital-intensive
goods".Table 5
Manufacturing Trade of Greece, Portugal and Spain with the






































Source: Schatz [1981, p. 22].
Although Greece, Portugal and Spain have experienced a process
of rapid industrial growth and have been able to restructure
their exports, in the 1970's they showed some differences com-
pared to the EC-9. This was concluded among others from trade
overlap coefficients which indicate to what percentage degree
imports and exports stem from the same industry groups.
In the 1970's, the EC-9's world manufactured goods imports and
exports by industry overlapped to 80-85 %, what means an in-
tensified intra-industry trade. At the same time the degree of
specialization within the same industrial branches was lower in
the Three, and with a clearly increasing tendency only in the
period 1970-1974. Out of the Three, Spain came closest to the
EC-9 trade overlap values. In trade with the EC-9, the coeffi-
cients for all three countries were significantly lower than in
the trade with the world, pointing to a more complementary di-
vision of labour instead of a substitutional one. Therefore,
differences in comparative cost advantages appeared more vi-
sibly vis-a-vis the EC-9 than vis-a-vis other countries of the
world [Schatz, 1981].Table 6
Overlap Coefficients of Greece, Portugal, Spain and the EC-9






















































A coefficient's value of 1 would mean that a country (region) imports in
each industry in value terms the goods which it exports.
Source: Schatz [1981, p. 24].
3. Economic Liberalization
Until the end of the 1970's there has been traditionally a sub-
stantial degree of state intervention in Greece, Portugal and
Spain in most spheres of economic life. However, a tendency to
liberalize the domestic economies could be observed. In the
case of the foreign sector it underwent liberalization of the
current account (goods and services markets) on the one hand,
and liberalization of the capital account on the other.
The public sector in Greece, Portugal and Spain has played an
important role throughout the budget, although minor as in the
EC-12. In the 1960's and 1970's governments' spending in these
countries increased considerably [Baklanoff, 1978]. It was
among other things due to the economic crises (e.g. after the
first oil-shock in 1973 which led to sharp increases in trans-
fers, subsidies and income-maintenance expenditures], and also
due to tendencies to fulfil many unsatisfied social demands
which had been neglected under the previous governments. Of
great importance was also that there was no full liberalization


















Budget Deficit and Government Debt in Greece, Portugal, Spain
and EC-12
a in 1961-1981 (% of GDP)
Specification Region/Country 1961-1973 1974-1981











Divergence from EC-12 Greece
Portugal
Spain
a In 1961-73 without Portugal and Spain.
Source: EC [1990 p. 280-295] and own calculations.
In the 1960's and especially in the 1970's P.rice_controls in
Greece, Portugal and Spain have been reduced remarkably. The
reduction of price controls and other forms of deregulation of
domestic economies (e.g. reforms of tax systems) started in
1959 in Spain, followed by Greece and Portugal during the be-
ginning sixties. Still at the eve of the 1980's price controls
remained for many goods (e.g. in Spain for some energy pro-
ducts, tobacco, telephone, public transport, some basic food-
stuffs and some pharmaceutical products). These products were
controlled i.a. because the state was by far the largest buyer
(e.g. of Pharmaceuticals in Spain) or because most of them were
provided by natural monopolies [Dehesa, 1989; Macedo, 1987].10
The l§bour_markets have also been liberalized, albeit not
fully. Until the end of the 1970's many labour laws designed to
secure social peace created inevitably distortions in these
markets both in terms of wage setting policies (weakening the
link between wages and productivity) and in terms of labour
mobility and employment prospects.
In the analysed period also liberalization of the financial
n^hfts has started (e.g. in 1978 in Spain saving banks were
allowed to act as full banks). But the bulk of liberalization,
especially liberalization of rate of interest, was postponed.
Deregulation of the domestic markets has been accompanied in
Greece and especially in Spain by a process of Privatization
and_regrivatization of state-owned companies. Some of the lar-
ger ones (e.g. Banco Exterior in Spain) have been privatized
partly on domestic and foreign stock markets, others have been
sold to domestic and/or foreign buyers without any nationalis-
tic discrimination. By contrast, in Portugal the 1976 consti-
tution explicitly ruled out privatization.
Before the 1960's a policy of inward-oriented development,
based on import substitution in manufacturing behind high pro-
tective barriers and supported by the establishment of state
enterprises in activities regarded as crucial for the develop-
ment process was typical for Greece, Portugal and Spain. There-
after a long process of liberalization of the current account
has started there. Spain was the leader. In 1959 (so during the
Franco regime) in order to overcome the consequences of quasi
autarky (distorted cost structures, diseconomies of small
scale, undue capital-intensiveness of production, lack of in-
ternational competitiveness, serious deficit of the balance of
payments, the complete exhaustion of foreign currency reserves)
and in order to gain credibility by joining the IMF and the
GATT, Spain began to fulfil the requirements imposed on it by
those institutions. Additionally in 1970 Franco was forced to
continue the liberalization in order to be able to join the EC11
and to get European political recognition. As Dehesa [1989, p.
2] stated "it ended in a mere preferential trade agreement that
increased trade with the EEC, made trade more open, and in the
long run, was very positive for the Spanish economy". Similar
were the consequences of trade barriers' reductions undertaken
after Franco's death. By the end of 1980 the Spanish trade li-
beralization i:
in the annex).
beralization index was 15,9 compared with 0 in 1955 (table 1
Greece and Portugal have started with trade liberalization in
the 1960's. In the case of Portugal it was connected with her
membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, 1960),
and in the case of Greece with her period of association to
the EC (1962-1981). This period was characterized i.a. by the
gradual elimination of tariff barriers coupled with the active
use of domestic policy instruments (e.g. differential indirect
tax rates on imports) for the selective protection of indus-
trial activity [Katseli, 1990; Sarris, 1990; Corado, Macedo,
1989].
Greece was the only country among the Three which concluded an
association agreement with the EC. It was the first agreement
of that kind and it was based on the will of Greece to join the
EC and on the will of the EC to support the endeavours of this
country. In order to reach the agreed aim the Greek economy
should gradually get closer and closer to the EC standards on
the one hand, and on the other Greece should strive to approach
these standards during the time of association. According to
this agreement the dynamic development of the Greek economy, as
well as the improvement of the employment environment and of
the conditions of life in Greece should be supported by the
financial resources of the EC. In order to speed-up the deve-
The index takes into account nominal tariff rates, border
adjustment tax, export tax rebates, quotas, state trading
and real effective exchange rates. Index close to zero means
strong protectionism and index close to the 20 mark means
full trade liberalization.12
lopment of mutual trade and other forms of economic relations
the partners agreed to create gradually a customs union, and
additionally to coordinate economic policies. Some exceptions
from the liberalization were provided (mainly agriculture and
agricultural trade). During the transition period of twelve
years Greece was obliged to apply the common external tariffs
of the EC. There were also provisions concerning other forms of
economic cooperation. Among other things, both sides agreed not
to discriminate for nationalistic reasons and to create condi-
tions for the free movement of people and services. Additio-
nally, Greece should apply the EC principles concerning compe-
tition, taxation etc. It was provided that the so-called Asso-
ciation Council - the most important institution created
could widen general provisions of the agreement, if necessary.
During the meetings of the Council trade policies should be
coordinated and economic, and monetary policies should be con-
sulted. Some other institutions were established. They were
organs supporting the Association Council and additionally a
Law Tribunal with a task to solve definitely the problems which
could not be solved during the meetings of the main common in-
stitution [Kramer, 1991].
Not only Greece partly liberalized international movements of
people and services. During the 1960's and 1970's there were
also many such attempts in Spain and - to a smaller extent - in
Portugal. It was one of the reasons - albeit not the most im-
portant one - that an emigration process from these countries
which resulted intitially in emigrant remittances (this finan-
cial capital being very important source of growth in the
Three) and then with some repatriation. It is worthwhile to add
that at the time of repatriation the respective inflow - in
contrast to the time of emigration - consisted mainly of humanBibiiofhek
13 des Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
capital in the form of enhanced labour skills (the so-called
emigration-repatriation cycle).
During the 1960's also liberalization of capital account has
started. Interestingly, it was also forced from outside. Any-
way, in such a way the situation developed in Spain in 1959.
One of the requirements of the IMF and the GATT imposed on the
authorities of this country was to start opening up the economy
to foreign investments and this has really happened. Similar
requirements were imposed on Greece and Portugal which distin-
guished themselves through the longest transition periods and
relative weak government commitments on internal and - par-
ticularly - on external economic liberalization [Macedo, 1987;
Katseli, 1990].
4. Macroeconomic Policy
The microeconomic foundation has been of great importance in
Greece, Portugal and Spain. With regard to stabilization and
structural policies these countries, however, have performed
differently.
Katseli and Glytsos [1986] put forward this idea having in
mind Greek experiences. According to them emigration and
repatriation can best be understood as phases of an inter-
temporal exchange of a factor which is relatively abundant
(e.g. unskilled labour in Greece), for a relatively scarce
factor, namely capital. Then financial capital (remittances)
flows, and in the time of repatriation skilled labour (human
capial). Exploring Greek-German relations they prove that
as expected - remittances per migrant were positively re-
lated to income per capita in Germany and negatively related
to income and the real interest rate in Greece. The results
suggested, however, that increases in the German interest
rate lead to increased remittances. As they have written
"higher German interest rates increase the attractiveness of
holding funds in German deposits accounts but they also in-
crease the wealth of immigrant deposit holders. Immigrants
are therefore wealthier and end to remit more money to
Greece; this wealth effect appears to dominate effects of
the higher return on German deposits" Katseli, Glytsos
[1986, pp. 2-3].14
Table 8
Key Macroeconomic Data for Greece, Portugal, Spain and EC-12*
in 1960-1981
Specification Unit Region/Country 1961-1973 1974-1981




















































































































































































































In 1961-1973 without Portugal and Spain. - In constant prices. -
Growth rate d/M3.
Source: As in table 7.
Until the first oil price shock the Three - like most other
OECD countries - pursued traditional demand management policies
designed to maintain high employment and economic growth in-
stead of fiscal restraint and an increasing reliance on re-
strictive monetary policy.16
Another important feature of the economic policies adopted was
promotion of wage restraint. These policies were usually sup-
ported by the IMF (e.g. Spain's stabilization programme from
1957). With the exception of wage restraint, the results
achieved were quite satisfactory. Partly it was due to the fact
that during that period there were relatively few internal and
external shocks.
The first oil crisis in 1973-1974 and the subsequent world re-
cession brought an end to the fast economic growth. After
having experienced a long period of rapid high-employment
growth with more or less balanced current accounts the eco-
nomies of Greece, Portugal and Spain - yet not these alone -
entered into a stagflationary period. They all suffered a deep,
long and severe economic crisis. One of the many consequences
was a shift of emphasis in economic policy from growth to eco-
nomic stability. Policy packages adopted in the three countries
were, however, slightly different and differently applied.
There were many reasons for this.
The development in Greece can be understood only with reference
to the role of the state and the public sector in the regula-
tion of economic activity. It is a country where "the inter-
locking set of interests between the state, financial institu-
tions and the traditional industrial families has created a
thin line between the "public" and "private" sectors of the
economy" [Katseli, 1990, p. 7]. This is manifested i.a. through
the pattern of ownership and management control (state owner-
ship and control over about 1/4 of the industrial enterprises
and over the two largest banks which cover around 2/3 of the
total banking business). Additionally, it is manifested through
the soft budgeting and through the institutional dual struc-
tures in all relevant markets. As Katseli [1980, p. 12] remarks
"in the commodity, credit or labour markets there still exists
on the one hand an "official sector" which can be either public
or private in its ownership structure, but which possesses
"command-economy" characteristics in resource allocation and
decision-making. The rules and commands pertaining to the17
effectiveness of regulations, to pricing, to taxation and sub-
sidization, to protection from competition, to hiring and
firing, to credit extention etc. have been traditionally nego-
tiated bilaterally usually between the enterprise and the rele-
vant decision-making authority and more seldom through repre-
sentative bodies (Federation of Greek Industrialists etc.). On
the other hand, there exists an extensive "unoffical sector
which consists largely of small-scale industrial or commercial
enterprises that possess no negotiating power but instead ex-
hibit more competitive behaviour in all relevant markets, often
operating in the "underground" economy". The final outcome are
many structural rigidities which inter alia influence negative-
ly the efficiency of macroeconomic policy. According to Katseli
[1990] the following are the most important ones in the public
sector activity:
a) Rigidities in the restructuring of public expenditures due
to past public sector employment policies that have raised
inordinately the share of wage bill (inefficient tax system,
low marginal efficiency of private sector investment etc.)
b) Rigidities in the functioning of labour markets due to
wage-setting behaviour in the public sector at large that
acts as a price-leader for the economy as a whole (higher
wages in this sector, excess supply of unskilled labour in
the private sector, entry into the public sector is negoti-
able and subject to bargaining, lobbying etc.)
c) Allocative and X-inefficiency in public sector operations
(the relatively low productivity growth in this sector due
to faster employment growth, outdated capital and ineffi-
cient modes of operation and management etc.)
d) Rigidities in revenue collection (e.g. the presence of the
underground economy which limits the tax base, soft taxation
where rules are unclear and negotiable)
e) Rigidities in public sector deficits and public debt
("structural" and growing public sector deficits, growing18
net debt interest payments etc.).
Rigidities in the public sector activity influence the whole
economic system. Transactions costs are high, market signals
are weak and the underground economy flourishes. This is par-
ticularly true in the soft budgeting environment, which leads
to price distortions, to the weakening of competition as a
central determinant of economic behaviour and to the weakening
of efficiency as the main determinant of survival [Gilpin,
1987, p. 19].
In the 1970's there were many endeavours in Greece to stabilize
the national economy by means of restrictive fiscal and mone-
tary policies and by exchange rate policy (tightening of eco-
nomic policies, devaluations of the drachma etc.). However, in
the above mentioned circumstances macroeconomic imbalances re-
emerged again and again leading to stagflation. The peaks cor-
responded to general election years (e.g. in 1974 and 1978)
reflecting the effect of the political cycle on the budgeting
which in these years was especially soft (relaxation of taxes,
more intensive subsidization of production etc.).
Also structural policy was generally ineffective. What was
more, structural changes were rather weak just due to the in-
efficiency of stabilization policy. Sometimes the changes were
even perverse (e.g. growing importance of the relatively low
efficient public sector). Due to soft budgeting a typical phe-
nomen was "entry-without-exit" which led to a persistent excess
capacity in Greek industry [Katseli, 1990].
After the first oil crisis Portugal entered into a stagflation-
ary period, too, but performed much better than Greece (see
table 8) - despite insufficient productive capacities relati-
vely to demand and despite sharp balance-of-payments disequi-
libria. This does not mean, however, that the role of the mar-
See table 2 in the Annex.19
ket forces in the allocation of resources was optimal there.
Quite to the contrary; there were many distortions because of
protectionism, administered interest rates and credit conditi-
ons, controlled prices, public sector deficits, operating cri-
teria of nationalized firms etc. However, this has been recog-
nized relatively early by the authorities and many appropriate
measures have been undertaken [Portugal, 1981].
The decisive set of stabilization measures was adopted in Por-
tugal as late as 1977 and in 1978, so with a great delay to the
oil shock. It was based in particular on expansionary fiscal
policy, restrictive monetary policy and a sliding devaluation
of escudo, and led to the current account equilibrium in 1979.
This improvement, however, was not very stable. This was con-
firmed in 1980 when a strong upswing in activity - with GDP
growing real at 5.5 % - entailed a renewed widening of the
current account deficit. Mainly due to a stricter enforcement
of price controls inflation declined somewhat but started to
accelerate again when these controls were relaxed.
Also in Portugal the rapid, and often uncontrolled expansion of
the public sector - concerning both general government and
public enterprises - was one of the most serious factors of
allocative distortions in the course of the 1970's. On the one
hand, the Portuguese tax system (based mainly on indirect
taxes) was very inflexible and open to tax evasion, and on the
other the value of general government expenditures remarkably
increased due to the pervasive spread of the welfare system,
due to the problems arising as a result of decolonization and
the reduction of emigration, and due to the nationalization of
some key industries and services [Portugal, 1981].
A delayed response to the initial negative impact of the first
oil shock has also been typical for Spain, where a climate of
uncertainty and political change was observed after General
Franco's death. Only in July 1977, a comprehensive macroeco-
nomic policy package was introduced by the new democratically
elected administration. The peseta was devalued by 15 % and20
monetary policy was tightened. It was not accompanied by re-
strictive fiscal policy. Therefore, there appeared many rigi-
dities and distortions in labour market which in conjunction
with the factors mentioned above led to the disappearance of
the effects of devaluation and restrictive monetary policy
[Hudson, Rudcenko, 1988; Dolado, Vinals, 1991].
Spain distinguished itself as a country in which many of the
structural weaknesses of the national economy exposed to the
changing international environment were dealt not solely by
evolution of the economic system and improvement of the eco-
nomic management. One of the institutional adjustment initi-
atives in the 1970's was the National Energy Plan (PEN) first
adopted in 1979. According to Hudson and Rudcenko [1988, p. 64]
"the PEN identified several basic problems in Spain's energy
industry; excess capacity both in electricity generation and in
oil refining, excessive energy consumption per unit of output
... and financing problems in the electricity industry. The
variety of measures proposed to deal with these problems inclu-
ded major nuclear power investment, investment into energy con-
servation, and energy pricing policies to allow more rational
energy use and help reduce the financial dependence of the
electricity industry on borrowing".
II. Economic Policy and Performance of the Mediterranean Coun-
tries in the 1980's
1. Role of the Public Sector and Situation in the Budget
During the 1980's the role of the public sector has consider-
ably increased in the three Mediterranean countries taken to-
gether. While general government spending in the EC-12 repre-
sented in 1981 about 47,0 % of GDP (in Greece 39,9 %, in Por-
tugal 41,7 % and in Spain 35,6 %) , and then stabilized, in
Greece it rose to 54,6 % by 1990, and in Spain to 42,7 %. In
the case of Portugal it increased to 42,7 %.21
Out of the Three Greece distinguished itself as the country
with the greatest importance of the public sector in the econo-
mic activity. Another characteristic of this country was the
growing imbalance in the budget. While Greece's receipts share
in GDP almost did not change, the expenditures/GDP ratio
increased substantially.
Table 9
General Governments' Current Receipts and Expenditures in the












































































































































































Source: EC [1989, pp. 274 and 275] and EC [1991, pp. 264 and 265].23
The growing role of the public sector has been accompanied by
budget deficits. These were higher in the Three than in the
whole EC-12, Spain being exception since 1987. The gap between
expenditures and revenues was extremely high in Greece. Addi-
tionally, while in Portugal and Spain this gap decreased, the
opposite trend appeared in Greece. Due to the growing deficit,
the Greek governments' debt increased. In 1982, this country
public debt was relatively lower than in the EC-12 but in 1990
considerably greater. The increase in debt ratio to GDP was
worst in Portugal. These phenomena can be explained to a great
extent by the rigidities mentioned earlier. But this is not the
whole story. '
2. Economic Liberalization
In the 1980's a series of decisions were taken in Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain in order to liberalize the economic life. It
was mainly due to the EC membership and due to the tendency to
deepen the process of economic integration through the creation
of an internal free market by the year 1992.
Liberalization of domestic markets has been continued, particu-
larly liberalization_of_grices_of_goods_and_services. Neverthe-
less, some price controls have remained in operation there. The
situation was clearest in Spain. In the eighties, price con-
trols have been reduced there to cover only 12 % of the total
consumer price index (CPI). All prices for services were free
including housing rents [Dehesa, 1989]. By contrast, in Portu-
gal and Greece price controls and selective protection coupled
with credit rationing and subsidies on the cost of capital were
the most commonly used regulatory instruments. E.g. in Greece a
maximum price was set by the Ministry of Commerce on basic con-
sumer goods, chiefly foodstuffs (the so-called essential pro-
ducts and in short supply). For the so-called essential goods
and not in short supply (other consumer products such as
clothes, books, paper etc.) the Greek Ministry of Commerce set
a maximum allowable mark-up over average unit costs. Only the
so-called non-essential products (ca. 32.5 % of CPI in the24
mid-eighties) were exempted from controls [Katseli, 1989;
Greece 1990/1991].
In the 1980's Greece, Portugal and Spain have liberalized also
l§^°y£_5!§ElS§ts. However, there still existed non-competitive
forces. In Spain it was mainly the relatively high degree of
indexation of wages what meant that demand shocks had few real
consequences for unemployment and labour mobility (nominal wage
growth offsetted price changes) and on the other hand wage in-
dexation exacerbated the unemployment and mobility consequences
of real supply-side shocks. In Portugal and Greece wages, em-
ployment policy and social policy have been in general deter-
mined within the official sectors with governments, public-
sector unions and employers of large firms being the main ac-
tors. Wage setting by the public sector has affected mostly the
labour market. The private and unofficial sectors have been
price-takers.
Also financial_markets have been further liberalized. In Greece
many new banks and their branches have been opened but the com-
mercial banking system was still dominated by two banks and
therefore competition was limited. Asset markets were underde-
veloped and stock markets have not been developed. Real inter-
est rates were often subsidized and negative. The same has been
typical for Portugal. In 1981 in Spain assets and liabilities
rates of interest were liberalized for operations of six months
and longer, in 1987 all interest rates were liberalized and in
the next years a number of new regulations made most financial
markets and institutions more free and flexible (e.g. opening
up of banks to all types of financial activities and stock
markets to all financial institutions, unification and compu-
terization of the four existing markets that work now conti-
nously). Financial liberalization reached also
The Commercial Bank of Greece and the National Bank of
Greece covering around 2/3 of total banking business, it
means deposits, credits, credit cards etc., and about 75 %
of the toal assets of commercial banks.25
the public sector. Competition was additionally increased due
to the active role played by foreign banks. However, the merger
of two major banks into a new, now biggest bank of the country
took place in the meantime and it increased the industry-speci-
fic risk of the banking sector and led to negative effects on
competition. On the other hand, the stage of development of
Spanish financial markets is very assymetrical; while the in-
terbank market and the market for short- and medium-term go-
vernment debt are well sophisticated, the stock market and the
markets for private debt instruments (long-term private bonds,
mortgages etc.) are underdeveloped. As Vinals et al. [1990, p.
44] note "other negative factors are the recent increase in
interest-rate volatility, the low degree of development of pen-
sion funds and other natural buyers of long-term bonds, and the
lack of long-term public bond issues which leaves the private
market without a reference point. In any case, the lack of de-
velopment of the long-term private bond market has fairly nega-
tive implications for the access of firms to badly-needed long
term capital, as it is the case with utilities and other capi-
tal-intensive industries. This makes firms resort to the Euro-
market, to higher than desirable short-term financing, or to
tapping the less reliable equity market. Still, for many small
firms bank credit is the only option to finance long-term ca-
pital needs".
There has been some progress in the issue of privatization and
reprivatization also. However, the results were different. As
mentioned earlier, despite some privatizations public enter-
prises have still played an important role in the Greek econo-
my. What more, while soft budgeting has been a principal mode
of operation these enterprises' large deficits were especially
financed by way of state grants and special bank loans what has
had implications for the allocation of resources and overall
economic efficiency similar to the support to loss-making
private enterprises. Greek public enterprises, generally con-
sidered to be low in many respects, have usually been not com-
petitive even vis-a-vis public enterprises from Portugal and
Spain.26
Table 11
















































































a Productivity is measured as the share of total sales in dollar terms to employment. Profit-
ability is proxied by the ratio of after-tax profits to total sales. The reference year is
1985.
Source: Greece [1990, p. 62].
In March 1988 in Portugal was passed a law allowing the trans-
formation of public enterprises into corporations in which the
state would retain 51 % of total equity, and in June 1989 a
Constitutional Amendment which provided the basis for a com-
plete (100 %) privatization of public enterprises was accepted
by the Parliament. Then in April 1990 legislation concerning
privatization was passed and then the government embarked upon
a programme of privatizing enterprises nationalized after 1974.
Just in 1990 the sale of the shares of state-owned enterprises
and banks has started [Portugal, 1991].
Out of the Three privatization and reprivatization processes in
Spain have been the farest reaching due to a large special pro-
gramme. There were many examples of the so-called big privati-
zation and reprivatization (e.g. SEAT was sold to Volkswagen
and the previously nationalized Rumasa holding has been repri-
vatized) . At the end of the 1980's the Spanish state-owned27
companies taken as a whole were not loosing money [Dehesa,
1989] .
The 1980's were a period of rapid liberalization of current ac-
count , and especially of trade flows. Greece's post-entry trade
liberalization had two sub-periods. The first one (1981-1986)
was characterized by faster dismantling of existing trade bar-
riers, especially tariffs and quotas, the second (1987-1990) by
the gradual elimination of subsidies and by the dismantling of
import credit restrictions. In January 1989, the regulatory tax
on imports was abolished. However, trade liberalization has not
taken place with equal force in all industrial sectors; till
1985 nominal protection rates declined for imports in tradi-
tional sectors and consumer goods, while the authorities in-
creased them for the import-competiting capital-goods sectors.
Additionally, as Katseli [1990, p. 60] underlines "if domestic
production taxes and subsidies are also taken into account in
the calculation of total protection afforded to industrial
sectors, it appears that in the first part of the 1980 "s effec-
tive protection has in fact increased substantially for inter-
mediate goods and manufacturing equipment and declined only
slightly for manufactured consumer goods. ... Thus, at least
till recently, the decline of nominal tariff protection for
imports from the EC countries was largely offset by the do-
mestic subsidies and the imposition of domestic taxation".
With the accession to the EC in January 1986, Portugal and
Spain have engaged in the programmes of trade liberalization
over a period of seven years ending generally (with some ex-
ceptions) in December 1992, and that will result in the total
absence of trade barriers (customs duties, quantitative re-
strictions etc.) with the rest of the EC and EFTA and the adop-
tion of a lower common external tariff for industrial products
coming from other countries of the world. They have also en-
gaged in the programme "Europe 1992" which foresees among
others full liberalization of services' turnover and liberali-
zation of public procurements' markets [Portugal, 1986; Dehesa,
1989; Vinals et al., 1990].28
The Accession Agreement signed by Portugal and the EC provides
in the case of agriculture two types of transitional arrange-
ments. The "conventional" one comprises a seven-year transition
period at the end of which the prices of the products in
question (e.g. tobacco and sugar) must be fully aligned on
those being applied in the EC. The majority of agricultural
products, including those that are most important for Portugal
(grain, rice, fruit and vegetables, wine, most meats), were,
however, subject to transitional arrangements comprising two
five-year periods. During the first five years, Portugal was
obliged to begin introducing a package of measures in order to
bring prices and subsidies into line with those being applied
in the rest of the EC (harmonization) and then it is expected
to adopt the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) principles till
1996. Customs duties and quotas should also be abolished over
the seven to ten years depending on the arrangements applicable
[Portugal, 1986] .
The Spanish agricultural entry conditions are similar. The tran-
sition period for most products is seven years with the excep-
tion of fruit, vegetables, olives and olive oil. In these cases
tariffs are to be reduced to zero at the end of 1995. Special
arrangements are applied to wine and olive oil. As in the case
of Portugal, Spain is expected to apply all the rules of CAP by
1996.
1
With their accessions, Greece, Portugal and Spain have been
admitted to the Common Fisheries Policy of the EC. There were,
however, some severe limits on catches (e.g. 300 Spanish ves-
sels were allowed to fish but only 150 at one time). Portugal
and Spain have additionally concluded a bilateral detailed
agreements regulating respective problems.
1 For a period of four years (till 1989) Spain could impose
restrictions on imports of certain meat products.29
With their accessions the Three have aligned their patent laws
with the Munich Convention of European Patents. Immediately
from entry Greece, Portugal and Spain are subjects to EC anti-
trust and state subsidy controls (with some exceptions, how-
ever, e.g. with special arrangements for steel in the case of
Spain). The EC consumer and product standards are also applied.
Since joining the EC the value added tax (VAT) is in force. One
of the major advantages of the VAT is that it provides a
built-in control on tax evasion, lack of which was one of the
main shortcomings of the old tax systems (e.g. of the turnover
tax) .
Table 12
VAT Rates and Structure in Greece, Portugal, Spain and





















































Excluding zero rate. - Receipts of general consumption taxes as per-
centage of private plus public consumption.
Source: Portugal [1991, p. 74].
The signing of the Association Agreement of Greece and of Por-
tugal's and Spain's Accession Agreements with the EC have mar-
ked the beginning of the new era of labour migration. All the
three countries were expected to create conditions for the free
labour movement in a some year transition period (e.g. Portugal
and Spain in seven years, except for Luxembourg, for which a
ten-year transition period has been foreseen).30
The Agreements with the EC have also opened the way for a pro-
gressive liberalization of capital account. After transitional
periods of some years (5 and 7 in case of Portugal and Spain),
the Three should apply the rules concerning capital movements
being in force in the other EC countries. Foreign direct in-
vestment in the Iberian countries should be gradually liberal-
ized in a period of four to five years. There were also pro-
visions concerning liberalization of the domestic and foreign
exchange markets (e.g. the necessity to establish the interbank
market and to open up the banking system to external competi-
tion, the possibility to join the European Monetary System
EMS) .
Remarkable progressive liberalization on capital account has
come true. Greece has established the interbank market, intro-
duced many new banking services (e.g. leasing, factoring, for-
faiting etc.) and - first of all - has opened up to great ex-
tent her capital market and banking system. According to the
OECD experts, the most important positive changes in the area
of deregulation were the following:
a) abolition of discriminatory credit restrictions against
certain categories of imports (mainly consumer goods)
b) liberalization of borrowing in foreign exchange from abroad
c) abolition of prior approval by the Bank of Greece for export
credits in drachma or in foreign currencies for investment
abroad
d) introduction of permission to EC nationals (non-resident in
Greece) to transfer to EC countries and/or invest in go-
vernment paper earnings from real estate and a few other
sources
Previously these sums were blocked in special drachma ac-
counts with strongly negative real interest rates.31
e) change in laws and regulations permitting the development of
leasing and the use of credit cards
f) passing of a new law which has lifted bank secrecy in case
of criminal investigation [Greece, 1990].
Accession to the EC in 1986 and preparation for the completion
of the programme "Europe 1992" have provided the opportunity
for financial liberalization in Portugal. Their derections were
similar to those in Greece. In June 1990, the Portuguese go-
vernment announced additionally its intention to take the es-
cudo into the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. However,
there has been still control, e.g. with regards to capital out-
flows [Torres, 1990; Macedo, 1990].
Out of the Three Spain has been the most liberal country with
regards to capital flows, particularly inflows. In 1985, as a
prerequisite to join the EC, many remaining restrictions on
foreign investment both direct, portfolio and real estate were
abolished, except for operations in few sectors (defence media,
communications and air transport). Most controls on foreign
portfolio acquisitions were suppressed. In 1987, liberalization
of the banking foreign currency holdings as well as the term
market for the peseta took place. In 1988, the liberalization
process was extended to Spanish portfolio and real estate in-
vestments abroad. Additionally domestic current accounts in
foreign currency for foreign trade operations have been opened
and in June 1989, the authorities decided to integrate peseta
in the EMS exchange rate regime. Like in the case of Greece and
Portugal, according to the Single European Market Act, the ma-
jority of the remaining barriers on capital flows have to be
abolished by the end of 1992 [Vinals, 1990; Dehesa, 1989;
Spain, 1991].
A specific part of the current account transactions have been
capital flows from the EC structural funds. Greece has been
entitled to obtain funds since 1962, and Portugal and Spain
since their EC entry in 1986. The bulk of the funds transferred32
were "structural funds". They have been used for infrastructure
developments (financed through transfers from the Regional
Fund), for structural changes in agriculture (financed through
transfers from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee
Fund) and for professional training (transfers from the Euro-
pean Social Fund). Additionally, the Three have benefitted by
loans from the European Investment Bank, from the World Bank
etc.
3. Macroeconomic Policy
In the 1980's the macroeconomic policies in Greece, Portugal
and Spain were similar to some extent. However, many differ-
ences additionally appeared. It was true for the stabilization
policy as well as for the structural policy.
3.1. Stabilization Policy
During the 1980's several stabilization programmes were pre-
pared in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Fiscal policy and monetary
policy had as a rule constituted their essential parts. How-
ever, as noted earlier, the most spectacular and probably the
most damaging feature during the last decade was the steep in-
crease in the public deficits. Greece distinguished itself to
its own disadvantage (see table 10).
The subsequent Greek governments have endeavoured to restrict
budget deficit by the fiscal policy and therefore VAT was in-
troduced, tax rates were increased and tax brackets were partly
indexed. However, there was a lot of tax fraud and evasion
which was more or less tolerated, particularly during electoral
periods [Alogouskoufis, Philippoulos, 1991]. On the other hand,
due to the inefficiencies in the public sector activity (e.g.
subsidies financed by printing money) and due to the rigidities
in the labour market (e.g. indexation of wages) expenditures
grew and inflationary tendencies appeared. The monetary autho-
rities tried to offset it through the imposition of restric-33
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Source: EC [1989, pp. 280-285], Beiheft A [1991] and EC [1991, pp. 270-281].
tive monetary conditions (e.g. introduction of a tight credit
allocation system, especially towards the private sector) and
then by increases of the discount rate, but it was only of li-
mited importance. This isn't surprising, since increases of
discount rate influenced to a great extent the financial situ-
ation of the highly indebted public sector [Katseli, 1990;
Greece, 1990]. As seen in table 13, a lack of serious stabili-
zation policy in Greece - to a smaller extent also in Portugal
and Spain - led very oft to higher increases of real compensa-
tions per employee than in the EC-12.34
The Portuguese fiscal and monetary policy during the early
1980's can be described as stop-go policy. There appeared in
part politically motivated cycles of restrictive and expan-
sionary policies. Since the EC accession coupled with the
introduction of many restraints, introduction of VAT and then
(in 1989) supported by the income tax reform (for both personal
and corporate income), fiscal and monetary policies were con-
solidated and it led to substantial improvement of the economic
environment and to the reduction of the public sector deficit.
Still, as Macedo [1990, p. 13] puts it forward "unless public
finances are reformed, a resumption of stop-go macroeconomic
policies will be unavoidable". The financial reform is not
possible without substantial institutional and structural
changes (e.g. further liberalization of the markets, priva-
tization etc.) .
Due to relatively sound fiscal and monetary policies also the
financial situation of the Spanish public sector remarkably im-
proved (see table 10). Concerning fiscal policy, a VAT was
introduced and taxes on incomes were increased. It was accom-
panied by the moderation of current transfers and public con-
sumption. Additionally, when necessary (e.g. in mid 1989 in
response to excessive monetary growth and clear signs of over-
heating) the monetary stance was tightened (even imposition of
a ceiling on bank credit expansion, raise of the minimum re-
serve ratio etc.). It is worthwhile to add that the decision of
the Spanish authorities to enter the rate of exchange regime of
the EMS has greatly increased the credibility of the anti-in-
flationary resolve of the government. It has, however, elimi-
nated the Bank of Spain's ability to pursue an independent
interest-rate policy [Spain, 1991].
3.2. Structural Policy
Despite remarkable progress of the economic liberalization and
some consolidation of Spanish and Portuguese fiscal and mone-
tary policies, the structural policy in the Three (particularly
in Greece) was characterized by a relatively high degree of35
state intervention in the allocation of resources. Even at the
end of the 1980's there has been a lot to do in order to in-
crease substantially the role of market forces in the struc-
tural adjustment.
Out of the Three, Greece has been the country where the govern-
ment clearly acted mainly as redistributor of resources with a
relatively limited role as a provider of public goods. Still,
many programmes of structural changes were launched there in
order to improve the infrastructure, to speed up investments,
industrial production etc. All this was supported by growing EC
financial assistance.
In 1983, a public body (the Business Reconstruction Organiza-
tion) was set up in Greece to supervise the management of over
40 firms representing more than a tenth of manufacturing output
and recognised as problematic mainly due to the overmanning and
heavy indebtedness. In the 1980 "s, these enterprises absorbed
about half of all state grants and subsidies. Even so - as OECD
experts write - their financial situation "... has improved
little, if at all. During the 1980's, employment has been
broadly maintained, while real sales even declined, apparent
labour productivity falling by some 15 per cent. Investment has
not recovered, leaving the capital stock in 1988 below its 1981
level. Apart from diverting real and financial resources from
potentially more profitable uses, problematic enterprises
adversely affect competing firms because of their dominant
position in certain markets. In textiles, ferro-nickel and
paper, problematic firms retain strong market power, in par-
ticular as regards price formation. In addition to the firms
which are officially recognised as "problematic", state-con-
trolled banks continue to heavily subsidize enterprises in
which they are major shareholders. Losses of problematic enter-
prises and state bank-controlled "ailing" firms amounted in
recent years to some half to two-thirds of their value added"
[Greece, 1990, p. 61] .36
Also in Portugal national structural programmes have been pur-
sued. They have mainly aimed at providing the country with an
adequate infrastructure and training (e.g. Regional Development
Plan of 1986). There have also been realized specific pro-
grammes aiming at modernizing agriculture and industry [Portu-
gal-, 1990] .
As mentioned earlier, privatization is progressing in Portugal
and it is expected to improve economic performance in several
ways. However, there are still many state-owned enterprises and
banks often plaqued by inefficiencies, including overmanning
and misguided investments. As in Greece, but to a remarkably
smaller extent, these enterprises are subsidized. Therefore,
there remain substantial possibilities for improvement [Macedo,
1990].
Some structural adjustment initiatives have also been continued
in Spain having quite long experiences on this field (e.g. Na-
tional Energy Plans). In the 1980's, special additional pro-
grammes based on the principle of minimum government interven-
tion have been designed there to speed up the restructuring
process (e.g. industrial reconversion programme 1982 affecting
mostly basic and special steels, shipbuilding, electrical
goods, automobiles and fertilizers). In addition, some special
measures have been undertaken to encourage new business initia-
tives in areas most affected by the adjustment (mainly fiscal
and financial incentives by the creation of the so-called Ur-
gent Reindustrialization Zones - ZUR). All this has gone hand
in hand with efforts to cut losses in Spain's large public en-
terprise sector, particularly of enterprises controlled by the
INI state holding company [Hudson, Rudcenko, 1988; Spain,
1991].
There has been observed a relatively slow pace of the restruc-
turing programmes, and due to the high costs of job creation
the ZUR's have had less success than expected. Nevertheless,
the progress is evident (e.g. labour force reductions, energy
saving, sectoral specialisation agreements). It is particularly37
true for the improvement of efficiency of public enterprises.
In 1989, the INI announced a profit for the second consecutive
year [Spain, 1991] .
4. Economic Performance
4.1. Economic Activity and Stability
Due to the integration effects following the EC membership and
due to the upturn in the world economy during the second half
of the 1980's Greece, Portugal and Spain enjoyed a quite fa-
vourable external environment. However, different stages of
market deregulation and differences in the microeconomic policy
led to differentiated economic effects. It was particularly
true for the first target of the "magic quandrangle", namely
for economic growth. During the first half of the last decade,
growth was comparable in the Three, even though - as noted in
one of the OECD reports from 1991 [Greece, 1991, p. 11 - "the
two Iberian economies could not benefit from the positive
effects of trade creation and confidence (notably of foreign
investors) that normally arise from the participation in an
economic union such as the EC. After 1984-1985, these two
countries showed remarkable dynamism while the Greek economy
continued to stagnate". Economic growth of Greece was worse
than in the EC-12 practically during the whole last decade. On
the contrary, in the second half of the 1980's Portugal and
Spain performed from this point of view better than the EC-12.
Reflecting unsound policies in the 1980's Greece performed also
much worse - as indicated earlier in this paper - taking into
account internal stability. The budget deficit in 1990 reached
almost 19 % of GDP at the end of the last decade, roughly 5
times more than in the EC-12 and 3 times more than in Portugal
(see table 10).38
Table 14
Key Macroeconomic Data for Greece, Portugal, Spain and EC-12 in 1981-1990
Specification Unit

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
-0.7 -0.7 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.3 -0.1 -0.3
-0.7 -4.4 -5.0 -4.0 -8.2 -5.2 -2.5 -1.5 -4.8 -6.1
-12.2 -13.5 -8.3 -3.4 0.4 3.9 1.8 -1.4 -2.9 -0.3
-2.7 -2.5 -1.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 0.1 -1.1 -3.2 -3.5
0.0 -3.7 -5.1 -4.3 -9.0 -6.6 -3.3 -1.8 -4.7 -5.8
-11.5 -12.8 -8.4 -3.7 -0.4 2.5 1.0 -1.7 -2.8 0.0
-2.0 -1.8 -1.6 1.1 0.8 0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -3.1 -3.2
a Rate of growth. - Average 1974-1981.
Source: EC [1989, pp. 280-285], Beiheft A [1991] and EC [1991, pp. 214-281].
The size of the public sector deficit largely explains the high
inflation rate in Greece, much higher than in Portugal and
particularly - in Spain, and additionally much higher (in some
years even 6 times) than in the EC-12. However, from this point
of view also Spain and - especially - Portugal diverged from
the EC-12 to their own disadvantage. The case of Portugal is
easier to understand when having in mind the stop-go macro-
economic policies and the still dominant role of nationalized
enterprises and banks in the economy.
As regards unemployment, it was the highest in Spain where,
however, the situation on the labour market has remarkably im-
proved after accession even vis-a-vis the EC-12 (decreasing
divergence). Taking into account statistical data from table
14, Greece and particularly Portugal performed much better,
also in comparison with the EC-12. But as Vassilakopoulous
[1986] argues, whereas in the most EC countries registered
unemployment is almost identical with total unemployment, in
Greece it covers only about 1/3 of total unemployment (em-
ployment in the shadow economy, in the small family-enterprises
etc.). It is worthwhile to add that the proportion of self-
employed workers is also very high in Portugal [Macedo, 1990].40
Out of the Three Greece has also distinguished to its disad-
vantage as regards external imbalances measured in table 14 by
current account deficit (surplus) as a percentage of GDP. In
the 1980's, Greek current account balance was negative and di-
verged by far more than in the case of Portugal and Spain from
the positive current account balance of the EC-12. The external
financial situation of Portugal and Spain was also better in
this sense that in some years (e.g. in 1984-1987 in Spain) they
ran current account surplus.
The rather disappointing macroeconomic performance of Greece
manifested alsb through the so-called Emu indicator being the
sum of the rate of inflation, the budget deficit as a per-
centage of GDP, the budget surplus as a percentage of GDP that
is needed to reach the EC average within 10 years, the rate of
unemployment, and the current account as a percentage of GDP.
In 1990, such an indicator was higher for Spain than the EC
average (ca. 15 and 24 respectively) and therefore her perfor-
mance was worse than that of the EC-12. Portugal was close to
Spain, Belgium and Ireland. Greece, with an indicator of 53,2
in 1991, was in a class of its own [Wolf, 1991] .
4.2. Real Income and Catchinq-Up
During the 1980's, real income has increased in all three
analysed countries. As regards the catch-up process, however,
they performed in a different manner.
Spain is the country which on average has clearly matched
success in the catch-up process vis-a-vis EC-12. In the 1980's,
the relative position of Portugal almost didn't change, while
economic distance of Greece vis-a-vis the EC-12 substantially
increased. It was clearly a direct consequence of unsound poli-
cies and growing imbalances.41
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Source: As in table 14.
It was expansive consumption, with an average growth rate of
2 1/2 %, which sustained the low level of Greece GDP growth.
Due to an increase in public consumption financed partly by
printing money, and due to expansionary wage setting and
transfer payments (mainly pensions) the consumer spending has
remarkably increased there but simultaneously the national sa-
ving ratio has dramatically fallen (from 23 % in 1981 to 13 %
in 1989). By contrast, the saving ratios in Portugal and Spain
exceeded the EC average and since 1984 have systematically in-
creased (in the case of Portugal from 19 % in 1984 to almost
27 % in 1989, and in case of Spain respectively from about 20 %
to 23 %). So in Greece a growing consumption propensity has
been accompanied by investment crowding-out, while in Portugal
and Spain the reverse has been true. As a direct consequence
Greek investment rate of growth as a rule lagged considerably
behind the EC-12 average. Such was also the divergence of Spain
until 1984 and of Portugal until 1986. Later on this has
Gross saving ratio = gross national disposable income minus
private and government consumption as a percentage of GDP.42
changed to the advantage of the Iberian countries (see table
14) .
Table 16
Gross Investments as Percentage of GDP in the EC Countries in 1981-1990
Specification Region/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Country
Investments/GDP EC-12 22.1 20.2 19.6 19.3 19.2 19.0 19.2 20.0 20.7 20.8
Greece 22.9 19.9 20.3 18.5 19.1 18.5 17.4 17.9 18.5 18.9
Portugal 27.2 31.1 29.2 23.6 21.8 22.4 25.3 28.1 26.8 26.7
Spain 23.9 21.3 20.6 18.8 18.9 19.2 20.7 22.5 24.0 24.4
-0.5 -1.8 -2.1 -2.2 -1.9
3.4 6.1 8.1 6.1 5.9





































Source: As in table 14.
The catch-up process typically requires substantial saving and
investment efforts, and these requirements have been met by far
more in Portugal than in Spain. In the 1980's the gross invest-
ment ratios in these countries were on the average higher than
in the EC-12. The reverse was true for Greece where the rates
of growth of actual and potential output were therefore clearly
lower than in Portugal and Spain.
Table 17
Actual and Potential Output Growth in Business-Sector of
Greece, Portugal and Spain in 1980-1990 (% annually)





















Source: Greece [1991, p. 19].43
Due to the relatively weak investment effort (insufficient for
the catch-up process), Greek output expanded in the 1980's two
times slower than in Spain and Portugal. With capital accumula-
tion sluggish, in contrast to the developments in the two
Iberian countries, the efficiency of the productive system de-
clined in Greece (negative growth of total factor productivi-
ty) . It suffered from many other problems, among them also
structural ones.
4.3. Structural Changes
During the 1980's economic growth of Greece, Portugal and Spain
was characterized by the growing importance of the service
sector. However, the intensity of changes was different for
each country analysed.
Table 18
Structure of Production and Employment in the EC Countries in Selected Years
of the 1980's (%)
Specification Greece Portugal Spain EC-12









































































Other 23.0 24.1 42.4 15.2 14.7 30.4 33.4 24.7 35.2














































































































































Without Ireland and Spain. - With mining and quarrying.
Source: OECD [1991]; UN [1991]; IL0 [1991].
Despite decreasing share of agriculture (with forestry and hun-
ting) in total production and employment, the economic struc-
tures of Greece, Portugal and Spain have differed substantially
from that of all the EC countries. In the 1980's, the impor-
tance of agriculture measured by its employment share in Greece
and Portugal was almost three times higher and in Spain almost
two times higher than the EC-12 average. It influenced negati-
vely productivity growth since it was the lowest just in this
sector.
Due to many rigidities in the labour markets and limited effi-
ciency of macroeconomic policies Portugal and Spain were in a
position to use structural adjustment (labour outmigration from
the first sector to industry and services) in their economic
development only to a small extent. The significance of agri-
culture and of the low efficient public sector with respect to45
employment was very high and changed only slowly.
Table 19
Economic Productivity by Sectors in Greece, Portugal and Spain
































































































Respective shares in production divided by shares in employment and then multiplied through
100. - With mining and quarrying.
Source: Data from table 18; own calculations.
Katseli [1990] argues that in Greece rigidities in the
labour market correspond to the rigidities in the function-
ing of public and private sector markets. He summarises
these rigidities as follows:
a) segmentation of the labour market between rural and urban
and between "official" and "unofficial" labour markets
with important barriers to entry and limited mobility
b) wage setting behaviour on the part of the public sector
that provides guidelines for private sector settlements
regardless of labour market conditions at the industry or
enterprise level
c) job-mismatch distortions due to wage-setting and employ-
ment policies and educational rigidities (e.g. wage-set-
ting by the public sector creates disincentives for
hiring skilled labour for jobs in the private sector).
According to Katseli these rigidities can be attributed to
the workings of the state corporatist model. They give rise
to classical and structural unemployment.46
4.4. Openness and Competitiveness
Before joining the EC, the Greek, Portuguese and particularly
the Spanish economy belonged to the relatively less open ones.
However, in the meantime the siutation has changed consi-
derably.
Table 20




































































































































Source: GUS [1991 and earlier issues].
During the 1980's the Three, especially Spain, increased their
shares in world imports and (except Greece) in world exports.
Due to many reasons, and particularly due to the gradual
liberalization of external sectors, also the shares of foreign
trade in GDP of these countries were increasing.47
Table 21
Shares of Goods' and Services' Imports and Exports in GDP




































































































































































































Source: As in table 3.
Data in table 21 clearly point out that the economies of the
Three after EC-accession responded quite different. In case of
Greece the share of foreign trade (total trade as well as in-
tra-EC trade) in GDP has considerable increased since 1981 but
it was mainly due to substantial trade expansion (trade crea-
tion + dynamic effects of opening up the economy) on the import
side (see table 3 and 21). Import expansion from the EC could
See: Mendes, Thirlwall [1989]; Castillo, Martinez, Sanchis
[1989]; Silva [1989]; Fernandez, Gonzalez, Suarez [1989];
Corado, Macedo [1989]; Courakis, Roque [1989]; Vinals et al.
[1990]; Katseli [1990]; Beyfu(3, Kleine [1991]; Plummer
[1991] .48
be observed particularly after mid-1980's when the situation on
the world market had improved and the Greece authorities had
decided to enter into the second sub-period of post-entry trade
liberalization.
Portugal's trade performance has been much more impressive and
more balanced. Trade expansion with the EC, mainly import ex-
pansion, occured particularly since mid-1980's and can directly
be attributed to entry trade liberalization [Beyfu(3, Kleine,
1991] .
Despite the long, gradual trade liberalization in Spain, the
intensity of its trade relations with the EC countries was re-
latively low before the accession to the Community. Immediately
after joining the EC it decreased to some extent. Then an
increasing tendency of the imports/GDP ratio has been observed
while the exports/GDP ratio stabilized.
Table 22
















































































































Source: BeyfuP, Kleine [1991, p. 36].49
On the whole, trade effects of the Three's accession to the EC
have been positive, while trade partners benefited more than
Greece, Portugal and Spain alone. Additionally, due to the
trade diversion effect, the other EC members could benefit at
the expense of third countries, especially developing ones
[Beyfu3, Kleine, 1991; Plummer, 1991].
There appeared a relatively substantial trade diversion effect
in Greece's foreign trade with the non-EC countries, while Ger-
many, Italy and the Netherlands were the most benefiting coun-
tries due to the trade expansion effect in Greece's intra-EC
turnover. However, greater trade diversion effect could be ob-
served in Portuguese foreign trade.
Table 23
















































































































Source: Beyfu|5, Kleine [1991, p. 35].50
Despite the fact that the shares of the EC-countries in the
foreign trade of Portugal on the eve of her EC accession were
higher than in the case of Greece, just Portugal increased much
more her trade-dependence (particularly import-dependence) upon
other EC-members, especially France, Germany and Italy. There
appeared also a rather remarkable increase of Portugal's trade-
dependence upon Spain. It was not accompanied by the symmetric-
al increase of Spain's trade dependence upon Portugal.
Table 24
















































































































Source: Beyfu(5, Kleine [1991, p. 34].
After the EC accession, Spain strengthened her trade relations
especially with France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
The share of Germany increased particularly in Spanish imports.
It was mainly due to Spain's increase import intensity by in-
vestment goods which belong traditionally to the leading German
export products [Beyfup, Kleine, 1991].51
Table 25
Conmodity Pattern of the EC Countries' Imports in Selected Years of 19&3-1990 (%)
Commodity Groups Greece Portugal Spain EC-12
1983 1985 1990 1983 1985 1990 1983 1985 1990 1983 1985 1989
a
Food & live Animals 11.8 11.5 12.7 10.3 10.6 9.0 8.2 7.3 8.7 10.3 9.8 5.4
Beverages & Tobacco 0.8 0.8 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Crude Mat. excl. Fuels 6.2 5.8 5.0 10.0 6.3 5.9 10.8 11.1 6.3 6.9 6.9 4.0
Mineral Fuels 27.4 29.5 7.7 26.8 26.4 10.8 40.4 36.2 12.0 2.2 2.1 8.2
Oils & Fats 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.4
Chemicals 8.4 8.6 10.6 10.1 10.3 9.1 7.8 8.5 9.9 8.8 9.4 10.3
Manufactured Goods 16.6 15.8 21.6 12.3 14.4 19.2 7.2 8.1 14.0 15.6 16.5 18.4
Machinery & Transport
Equipment 24.2 23.7 31.1 26.1 27.6 37.0 18.8 21.7 38.2 44.7 43.3 44.7
































Source: OECD [1981, 1985, 1991]; own calculations.
In the 1980 's commodity pattern of Greek, Portuguese and Spa-
nish total imports still diverged from the commodity pattern of
the EC-12 imports. However, in connection with the industri-
alization of the Three and the catch-up processes in these
countries a remarkable increase of the share of manufactured
products (particularly machinery and transport equipment) could
be observed. It was especially typical for the 1985-1990 sub-
period. Portugal and Spain distinguished themselves as coun-
tries which increased their imports of investment goods (e.g.
an increase of the share of machinery and transport equipment
by about 15 percentage points between 1985 and 1990) . Of
course, it has influenced evolution of the commodity patterns
of exports.
As from 1988, the OECD countries are required to report data
according to SITC Rev. 3. However, there is no discontinuity
in the published figures, since the data for the previous
years have been converted into SITC Rev. 3. One should note,
however, that the conversion has been done only back to the
year 1983. That is the reason that our analysis doesn't co-
ver the years 1981 and 1982.52
Table 26
Commodity Pattern of the EC Countries' Exports in Selected Years of 1983-1990 (%)
Commodity Groups
Food & live Animals
Beverages & Tobacco






























































































































































Source: As in table 25.
During the 1980's, particularly in the 1985-1990 sub-period,
growth rates of manufactured products exports were in all the
three countries substantially higher than growth rates of other
products bringing about that they increased their share at the
expense mainly of foodstuffs. However, what is important from
our point of view, at the end of the 1980's commodity patterns
of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish exports were not fully
convergent. While in 1990 exports of manufactured products
(SITC groups 5-8 taken together) accounted 55 % in the case of
Greece, it was 76.4 % in the case of Spain and even 80.5% in
It is worthwhile to add here that the distribution of manu-
factured goods exports from the Three and Poland (and other
East European countries) among the EC-countries markets was
alike and - according to ECE experts [ECE, 1989] - increased
substantially between 1965 and 1986. They argue that there
was a diversion of the EC's manufactured goods imports from
Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. The negative effects for the
East European countries were the largest in textiles and
clothing, basic metals, machinery and, to a smaller extent,
in food products [ECE, 1989] . See also: Plummer [1991] .53
the case of Portugal. In the same year exports of machinery and
transport equipment accounted for 19.7 % of Portuguese exports,
almost 40 % of Spanish exports, while in the case of Greece it
was only 4.2 %.
The accession of Greece and, particularly, of Portugal and
Spain to the EC, contributed substantially to the expansion of
the intra-EC trade, which rates of growth were in the 1980's
much higher than growth rates of the world trade [EC, 1989].
This phenomenon was brought about mainly by increases in manu-
factured goods' trade with the other EC countries which also
expanded considerably faster than manufactured goods' world
trade. As a consequence trade dependence of Greece, Portugal
and Spain upon the other EC countries by industrial products
remarkably increased.
Table 27
Trade Dependence of Greece, Portugal and Spain Upon Other EC Countries
by Industrial Products in Selected Years of 1983-1990 (%)
Commodity Groups Greece Portugal Spain









































Source: As in table 25.54
Some increase could also be observed of the other EC countries'
dependence on manufactured goods' trade with Greece, Portugal
and Spain could be observed. However, there was still a sub-
stantial asymmetry, particularly in the case of EC-12 imports
from the Three. It was partly due to the different export per-
formance of Greece, Portugal and Spain on the markets of their
partners from the EC.
Table 28
Trade Dependence of the EC Upon Greece, Portugal and Spain
by Industrial Products in Selected Years of 1983-1989 (%)
Commodity Groups Greece Portugal Spain









































Source: As in table 25.
As seen from data in tables 26-28, it was Greece which per-
formed worst among the Three as a supplier of manufactured
products on the markets of partners from the EC. Additionally,
as noted earlier, Greece distinguished itself as a country be-
nefiting the EC accession by far more than Portugal and Spain
on the import side (imports-biased membership) what from the
pure theoretical point of view can be in turn attributed more
or less to the following factors:55
a) export-oriented industries are not competitive on the world
market
b) restructuring and modernization of the national economy re-
quires imports of capital- and technology-intensive products
and influences propensity to imports
c) growing internal demand (e.g. balance of payments' credits
from other EC governments after the EC accession) can't
sufficiently be covered due to the limited internal produc-
tion capacities
d) growing liberalization on the current account and respective
growing openness of the national economy lead to the switch-
ing of the internal demand toward more competitive foreign
products.
As it seems, in case of Greece all the four factors were in
force, especially, however, factors listed under a) and d), and
this opinion is also shared by Katseli [1990] and by Beyfup and
Kleine [1991]. Katseli [1991, p. 64] argues additionally that
in the case of Greece "... import penetration ratio has increa-
sed rapidly in the traditional sectors, which faced a reduction
in the nominal protection rate. For the modern sectors, the
import penetration ratio increased after 1985 as trade became
liberalized in those sectors as well. With the exception of ...
shoes and clothing ... the export propensity ... has deterio-
rated as expected in the most technologically advanced sectors
..., and has increased in the traditional export sectors as
resources have shifted slightly in favour of the more traditi-
onal export sectors".
The outcome was quite different in the case of Portugal which
many years distinguished itself by rather ambiguous public res-
ponse to external liberalization but in the 1980's substantial-
ly liberalized its current account. It also faced an import-
bias after the accession but it was mainly due to factors spe-
cified under b) and c) [Beyfu(3, Kleine, 1991]. Additionally,56
there was some improvement of competitiveness. As Macedo [1990,
p.' 23] argues the so-called "strong-demand" sectors such as
office and data-processing machines, electrical and electronic
goods, and chemicals and Pharmaceuticals have been growing at
over 5 % p.a. since the 1960's. Growth of about 3 % p.a. iden-
tifies "moderate-demand" sectors, such as rubber and plastic,
transport equipment, food, beverages and tobacco, paper and
printing products and industrial and agricultural machinery.
Finally, the so-called "weak-demand" sectors, such as metal
products, miscellaneous manufactures, ferrous and non-ferrous
ores, textiles, leather and clothing and construction materials
have experienced a growth rate of less than 2 % p.a. in recent
decades".
Also in the case of Spain factors specified under b) and c)
were mainly responsible for the import-biased membership in the
EC. It faced some improvement of the competitiveness too, al-
beit not sufficient and not satisfactory enough. Fernandez and
Sebastian [1989] detected a very substantial positive long-run
impact of the Spain's accession to the EEC on her global non-
energy imports, and a short negative impact on total exports.
Vinals et al. [1990, p. 53] commented it as follows "Perhaps
the already very advantageous treatment of Spanish exports by
EEC countries in accordance with ... Preferential Treaty prior
to integration, and the unchanged legal status of exports to
non-EEC countries after integration can explain why there was
not a surge in exports. On the other hand, the disappearance of
hidden export subsidies caused by the introduction of VAT may
be behind the negative impact on exports...". Let's add to it
that in case of all the Three countries the underdevelopment of
intra-industry trade was of great importance. This made it
difficult to adjust quickly and to increase exports rapidly.57
Table 29
Overlap Coefficients
3 of Greece, Portugal, Spain and the EC-12


























































a Calculated according to the formula:





where X. and M. refer to exports and imports, respectively, of each of
the 35 commodity groups i at the two-digit SITC level 5-8 and "min"
defines the magnitude of the trade in manufactures which overlaps in
(dollar) value terms.
Coefficient calculated on data for 1989.
Source: OECD [1988 and 1991]; own calculations.
In the 1980's intensity of the intra-industry trade of the
Three was still lower than in the case of the EC-12. Greece
distinguished itself clearly to its own disadvantage. It didn't
come closer to the EC trade overlap values and even deterio-
rated when taking into account the situation in 1983 and in the
1970's (see table 5). Moreover, intensity of the Greek intra-
industry trade vis-a-vis the EC-12 was lower than vis-a-vis
other parts of the world - a notion which becomes plausible
taking into account that according to development levels Greece
was less close to the EC countries (especially to the highest
developed ones) than to the rest of the world.58
By contrast, Portugal and particularly Spain were in a position
to increase the intensity of intra-industry division of labour.
It was true both for the relations with the other EC countries
as well as for the relations with the EC non-member countries.
Moreover, in the second half of the 1980's the overlap coeffi-
cients in trade with the EC-12 were close to these coefficients
in trade with the rest of the world pointing to the same degree
of complementary division of labour. Spain provided clearly the
case of a relatively more diversified country with a dominance
of intra-industry instead of inter-industry trade. Portugal
followed.
There was an other factor responsible for the import-biased
membership of Greece's, Portugal's and Spain's membership in
the EC, namely their great dependence on revenues from ser-
vices' exports. Of great importance were particularly exports
of tourism services.
Table 30
Share of Services' Debt in Imports and Services' Credit in Exports











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: UNCTAD [1986 and 1991]; IMF [1991]; own calculations.
In the case of the Three additionally remittances of emigrants
were of great importance. While net private transfers for the
EC-12 showed deficits as a rule, in the case of Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain the opposite was true and thus additional
sources of financing imports were available.
While during the 1980's the private transfers' share in trade
of the EC-12 was almost negligible, it was in the case of the
Three quite remarkable. Remittances of emigrants played par-
ticularly an important role in the imports' financing of Por-
tugal ' s and - to a smaller extent - of Greece. On the one hand,
it influenced the scope and size of the imports'-biased mem-
bership of the Three in the EC, on the other one, the financial
situation of the analyzed countries.60
Table 31
Share of Private Transfers (net) in Imports and Exports















































































































Source: As in table 30.
4.5. External Balance and Financial Position
Many important differences between Greece, Portugal and Spain
have also been observed with regard to external balances and
payment's situation. It has been connected with many factors
earlier described.
In comparison with the EC-12, the balance of payments' per-
formance of Greece, Portugal and Spain was much more de-
stabilized during the 1980's; various balances' shares in GDP
were as a rule much higher and changed sometimes (e.g. trade
balances shares) dramatically from period to period. In con-
trast to the EC-12, the Mediterranean countries, particularly
Greece, benefited from the financial governmental transfers
from abroad. In 1990 these transfers amounted to 0.2 % of GDP
in Spain, 0.5 % of GDP in Portugal and 4.3 % of GDP in Greece.
Of course, the majority of financial assistance came from the
other EC member states.61
Table 33
Balances of Payments of the EC Countries in 1981, 1985 and 1990











































































































































































































































































Source: Greece [1991]; Portugal [1991]; UNCTAD [1991]; IMF [1991]; own calculations.
Due to relatively sound economic policy, relatively good eco-
nomic performance and additionally due to relatively low labour
costs Portugal and particularly Spain attracted foreign in-
vestors. Therefore, an inflow of the foreign capital to these62
countries could be observed [Taveira, 1989; Cabalero, Lahoz,
Rios, 1989].
Table 34
Long-term Capital Accounts of Greece, Portugal and Spain in 1981-1990






























































































































































































































Source: As in table 30.63
In the first half of the 1980's foreign direct investment (FDI)
in Spain fluctuated around the $ 1.5 bn level, with many new
companies being set up as well as capital bases being enlarged.
Then in the year of the EC accession FDI in this country more
than doubled, growing further in the following years. After the
EC accession (more concrete after 1987) increased also remar-
kably the value of FDI in Portugal reaching in 1990 the $ 1.9
bn level. It was not the case of Greece. In the 1980's FDI in
this country fluctuated between $ 0.4-0.9 bn. In contrast to
Portugal and particularly to Spain, Greece almost didn't in-
vested abroad. Despite of this, it's financial position was
worse than that of Portugal and Spain.
Table 35
Currency Reserves of the EC Countries in 1981-1990








































































































Source: EC [1989, pp. 249 and 271]; IMF [1991, pp. 394-675]; own calcula-
tions.
Taking the EC-12 financial position as sound in order to cope
with the foreign trade and/or current account deficit, Portugal
was in the 1980's in a best situation out of the Three. While
coping with such deficit Greece had to use foreign, often
volatile sources of financing to the greatest extent. Of
course, this adversely influenced its balance of payments.64
III. Lessons for Poland
An analysis of the experience of the Mediterranean countries
with their accession to the European Communities leads to se-
veral conclusions. These can be divided into four groups.
1. Political Environment and Dialogue
The most general conclusion which can be drawn for Poland from
the experience of the Mediterranean countries with their acces-
sion to the EC is that specific widespread political consensus
and social and political stability in a country are needed when
approaching the Communities and leading dialogue with them.
While not disregarding experiences and achievements of Greece
and Portugal, Spain seems to provide the best example with re-
gard to the solution of these problems. To put it briefly
Poland needs its own Moncloa Pact which can form a basis for
political and economic consensus among all social partners and
a guideline for political and economic austerity. For the tar-
get is known; it is to be in Europe and to follow the European
political and economic model and way of life. Like in Spain or
Portugal the promotion of "European" political, social, cul-
tural and economic ideas, norms and standards seems to be addi-
tionally necessary. Anyway, as it seems, the authorities of Po-
land should prepare and consequently pursue "European inte-
gration policy", and it is necessary not only in order to cope
with ambiguous response of many peoples and groupings.
Like the Mediterranean countries, Poland needs further the dia-
logue and compromises with many different multinational and
international organizations which can impose, reinforce or
sustaine democratization and transformation processes in the
country and give it simultaneously more necessary stability and
credibility. Due to many reasons dialogue and compromises with
the EC seem to be of special importance. On the one hand, in
December 1991 Poland has signed an association agreement with
the European Communities towards which it gravitates economi-65
cally, and on the other, just European Communities provide the
only realistically available set of institutional arrangements
to manage the integration of all the European economies. More-
over, they have the greatest experiences with regard to the
appropriate organization of the preparatory phases for the new
members (e.g. additional commitments, their moderations taking
into account specific problems of the applicants for full mem-
bership, provision of necessary political and economic sup-
port) . Anyway, dialogue and compromises taken with the European
Communities can be profitable for all the partners. There is,
however, one important aspect which should be underlined:
commitments are to be fulfilled. This lesson can not be
forgotten particularly during the transitional sub-period.
2. Economic Liberalization
Among the many requirements and preconditions for a satisfying
economic performance, catching-up and full membership in the
EC, a consequent and not reversible economic liberalization
seems to be of great importance. It should accompany the po-
litical one. In other words, it is necessary to introduce gra-
dually the rules of democratic game not only in the political
arena but also in economic markets. Spain provides once again
the best example how to materialize it.
Economic liberalization is a long-term process burdened with
enormous difficulties, and the recent experience of the Three
confirms it. But this experience leads simultaneously to the
conclusion that there are no viable alternatives. Moreover, it
is quite sure that countries more successful in promoting
economic liberalization (e.g. Portugal and particularly Spain)
are performing better than others (Greece in our case). The
reason is well-known; liberalization leads to the gradual eli-
mination of the many rigidities which exist in the markets of
goods and services, and in the labour and capital markets. An
additional lesson is that liberalization of domestic markets66
should proceed hand in hand with liberalization of the current
account.
It is rather difficult to compare the degree of the economic
liberalization in the Three and in Poland, but some tentative
conclusions can be drawn. While liberalization of internal
prices in Poland is comparable with that in Spain or Portugal,
the degree of regulation of other markets is in Poland un-
questionably much higher than in the Three. One has to add to
it the only partial (so-called internal) convertibility of the
Polish currency what results among other things in distorted
internal relative prices of goods and production factors. So
there is great potential to deregulate, further liberalization
of the domestic markets and a full currency convertibility
being the first necessary ingredients. Without them, the real
comparative advantages of Polish national economy will remain
by and large unknown, while just establishing these advantages
is clearly a starting point of the reintegration into the world
economy and of the necessary increase in competitiveness. With-
out these crucial steps, the unavoidable speeding-up of the
demonopolization and privatization processes are hardly to
imagine. As can be learned from the experience of Portugal and
Spain, it is also necessary to attract foreign portfolio and
direct investment, and this in turn can result in high growth
rates of production, exports and incomes and so contribute
additionally to the improvement in the nowadays very distorted
infrastructure and heavy demand conditions in Poland - these
determinants being very important for growth and development,
and for changes in comparative advantages.
Liberalization of the economic markets can be realized using
two different approaches. On the one hand it is possible to
create and put into force own original solutions and methods,
and on the other to adopt the ones which proved correct and
successful and simultaneously in such a way "bind own hands" by
compromises taken with multilateral or international organiza-
tions. The experience of Greece, Portugal and particularly of
Spain is quite clear. More promising and efficient is the se-
cond solution. Anyway, it helps to increase international con-67
fidence and credibility as well as makes the process of
systemic changes more understandable and transparent and
credible for the foreign partners. Important is also,
especially in Poland and other countries with long traditions
of inward-looking development and protectionism, that in-
ternational compromises and commitments create simultaneously
rather effective vehicles to alleviate strong internal re-
sistance to the liberalization of domestic markets and external
sector.
Sequencing to the economic liberalization is an important pre-
condition of success. There is no common pattern but Spanish
experience seems to be very interesting. It is to liberalize
when this is affordable while the external constraint being
decisive to force the appropriate decisions. As Dehesa [1989]
and Dolado and Vinals [1991] clearly point out, other important
disequilibria as unemployment, public sector deficit or infla-
tion have never been so important in Spain as the external
financial disequilibrium has been. On the other hand also the
order in which trade protection and financial protection are
removed matters. The experience of the Three is that external
trade liberalization precedes financial liberalization, espe-
cially liberalization of capital outflows.
3. Macroeconomic Policy
Greece's experience makes clear that sustainability of economic
growth and credibility of partners are only to achieve and to
secure when state corporatism and soft-budgeting are avoided.
They lead to price distortions, markets' rigidities and allo-
cative and x-inefficiency. Additional uncertainty is substan-
tial, transaction costs are high, competition is not a central
determinant of economic units' behaviour, efficiency criteria
are not the main determinant of survivals, the underground
economy develops and the economic imbalances are growing. In
such circumstances even membership in the EC and their economic
and political support do not by themselves secure the sa-68
tisfying economic performance. This is why Greece is today the
EC-member causing the biggest troubles and - in contrast to
Portugal and Spain - "euro-pessimism" exists there on the eve
of "Europe-1992".
The experience of the Three, particularly of Spain, indicates
that macroeconomic stability is necessary for sustainable
growth. Sound fiscal and monetary policies create a necessary
climate for saving, for internal and external investments and
thus promote productivity. Therefore, Poland seems to be
well-advised to give priority to a prudent fiscal and tight
monetary policy.
Macroeconomic stability and gradual economic liberalization
(convertibility of the currency including) are also necessary
for elastic structural adjustment to external and internal
shocks. Only in such circumstances one can expect flexibility
in the process of creation of the relative prices' structure
which is additionally more or less coherent with their struc-
ture on the world market. Imbalances in the financial markets
are to be removed by restrictive and transparent tax-system (of
course VAT including) and sound monetary policy should be pur-
suited by the fully independent national bank. A sound monetary
policy means first of all correct money creation, management of
reserve requirements and discount rate policy, and financial
markets adjusting elastically.
Also with regards to macroeconomic stability (perhaps first of
all) there is a lot to do in Poland in order to converge with
participants of the European Monetary System's exchange rate
mechanism, and even with Greece 1991 being with its Emu indi-
cator of 53.2 in a class of its own. According to experts from
the Polish Ministry of Finances the same indicator calculated
for Poland reached 262.6 in 1990 and 77.1 in 1991 [Raport 1991,
p. 29]. This means that in these years Poland have failed on
every criterion used when inspecting states' suitability for
European Monetary union (a rate of inflation "that does not
exceed that of the, at most, three best performing member69
states... by more than 1 1/2 percentage points" for the pre-
vious year; a currency that "shall have respected the normal
fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism
of the EMS without severe tensions for at least the last two
years"; "a nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed
that of the, at most, three best performing member states... by
more than 2 percentage points" in the previous year; and a
fiscal policy that avoids "gross errors", the criteria being a
ratio of planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic
product of 3% and a ratio of government debt to GDP of 60%).
When discussing the Spanish experience and drawing conclusions
for Poland, Spain's macroeconomic adjustment plans and pro-
grammes are especially studied and recommended by some Polish
economists (e.g. Bernas, 1989; Wieczorek, 1991]. It seems to be
a one-sided, even biased observation. It is true that some of
the weaknesses of Spain's (and not only) newly industrialized
economy had to do with energy plans and restructuring pro-
grammes. However, firstly, these governments' adjustment ini-
tiatives have been pursuited having in mind the principle of
minimum government intervention and secondly, and more impor-
tantly, particularly in Spain (but also in Portugal and - to a
smaller degree - in Greece) structural policies are nowadays
concerned with the supply side using mostly market allocation
mechanism in an as much as possible stabilized macroeconomic
environment. They address mainly the efficiency of resource use
and are more and more understood as mobilization of internal
and external savings and their redirection and allocation via
market forces. Mobilization of savings goes through the cre-
ation of financial market institutions, through liberalization
of these markets and through reprivatization, privatization and
- if possible - improvement of efficiency of public enterprises
(e.g. INI group's operations in Spain). Such an approach seems
to be reasonable. What doesn't seem to be reasonable is
Greece's experience to allocate many resources directly
(including financial support for structural changes from the
EC) to non-efficient sectors and branches. Petrification of the
old structures and low efficiency of production are the final70
outcomes [Beyfu3, Kleine, 1991].
The pace and sequencing of macroeconomic stabilization and
structural policies are difficult issues for themselves. There
are, however, some lessons from the experience of the Three and
the first is to avoid the stop-go macroeconomic policies and
their coincidence with political cycles. It is hard to avoid it
in Greece (to a lesser extent also in Portugal) and that in
turn influences clearly negatively economic performance.
Another lesson stems from Spain's experience, where the spe-
cific liberalization-adjustment sequencing has been observed.
There appeared economic liberalization when it was possible
(relatively high level of reserves due to good performance of
the balance of payments), and adjustment usually followed when
it was obligatory, this means when the balance of payments was
in deficit. According to Dehesa [1989] the economic adjustment
consisted usually of a strong devaluation followed by fiscal
and monetary tightening. Then as a rule economic liberalization
took place, first of all by means of gradually removing various
trade barriers and exchange controls.
4. Main Burdens and Gains of Eventual Membership
It seems to be an urgent task for Polish authorities to fulfil
in the following years the commitments of the association
agreement with the EC and this means first of all further
economic liberalization and macroeconomic stability. For,
however, this agreement is treated there as a vehicle for full
membership in the Communities, some observations concerning the
consequences of this possible event are reasonable to be made
based on the experience of the Mediterranean countries.
The most probable real impact of Poland's membership in the EC
seems to be a significant increase in the openness of the
national economy, especially in imports. Therefore a transi-
tional deterioration of the trade and current account is71
possible with all the consequences for employment, investment
and output (e.g. increase of unemployment, suffering of many
enterprises from relatively insufficient size and a relatively
low technological level, drop of output). The necessary struc-
tural adjustment and its costs are the accompanying ingre-
dients. On the one hand, distributional costs are to be ex-
pected (costs of reallocation of resources from stagnating to
expanding sectors), and on the other, some efficiency costs are
possible (unemployment costs, waste of some resources etc.). Of
course, changes in the structure of comparative advantage are
also unavoidable and it is connected with adjustment costs,
too. However, these costs are - as the experience of the
Iberian countries makes clear - negatively correlated with the
intensity of intra-industry trade; higher intensity of intra-
industry division of labour means lower adjustment costs and
the other way round. All this suggests appropriate anticipatory
policies and real response.
On the reverse side of the problem are potential real gains
from an eventual membership provided relatively (let's say like
in the case of Portugal and Spain) constant economic liberali-
zation and relatively sound macroeconomic policy. The first and
probably the most important seem to be welfare gains connected
with the increase of investment and aggregate demand as well as
with the trade expansion effects due to virtually unrestricted
access to the huge EC industrial market, greater openness and
higher level of competitiveness being expected after accession.
Without doubt, the possible accession can favour specialization
and economies of scale, the benefits from this being bigger,
the greater the flexibility of production factors and domestic
markets and the smaller the distributional and efficiency costs
of the necessary adjustment are. The experience of Portugal and
Spain makes clear that the structure of comparative advantage
transforms at the very beginning according to a typical
Heckscher-Ohlin model but then, after the financial opening to
foreign portfolio and direct investment, the comparative ad-
vantage may shift in the direction of mobile Schumpeter in-
dustries .72
Just the inflow of foreign capital and technology and related
effects seem to be the next positive real gains after opening
and stabilizing internal economy. This is very important. On
the one hand, the opening of domestic markets in conditions of
a stabilized political and economic environment may increase
the attractiveness of Poland for international capital and
technology inflows (like in the case of Portugal and particu-
larly in the case of Spain), and on the other, foreign capital
and technology are in Poland urgently needed. Quite under-
standable, accession to the EC entitles to various funds from
the many Communities' structural programmes. Additionally, the
EMS entry is possible and this in turn increases almost au-
tomatically, and substantially, the credibility of a given
country's monetary and exchange rate and fiscal policies (e.g.
Spain).
Last but not least, the experience of Portugal and Spain leads
to the conclusion that the opening of the markets to foreign
competitors together with many positive supply-side effects
connected with increased investment, invention and innovation
activities, and with more sound fiscal and monetary discipline
may reduce the inflation proneness of the national economy. For
this proneness is to great extent also typical for Poland, its
membership in the EC seems to be reasonable. Anyway, this
aspect is also to be taken into account when discussing and
evaluating pros and contras of the eventual EC entry. As men-
tioned earlier, also in the three Mediterranean countries
opinions with regard to the EC membership are mixed. What we
know today is that the majority of the reasons of "euro-
pessimism" or "euro-optimism" are internal ones. This lesson
seems to be also of great importance.73
Table 1
ANNEX
The Spanish Trade Liberalization Index*



































































See explanation in the text
Source: Dehesa [1989, p. 15].74
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Source: Katseli [1990, p. 93].75
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